Nnamdi is Gandhi (and other free agency thoughts…)

Please excuse the violently lame title—it’s been bouncing around my head for a while. I had to.

In the free agency class of 2011 there is defensive back Nnamdi Asomugha…and then everyone else. The rest of the class is made up of risky (but talented) veterans with baggage (think Braylon Edwards), mediocre and unproven quarterbacks teams are working themselves up into a frenzy for because elite throwers are such a hot commodity, and younger players with some promise looking to land their first mega-deal (I’m looking at you Charles Johnson and your $72 million).

In other words, Nnamdi Asomugha is the only sure thing in this entire crop of free agents.

So without further ado, five thoughts on the first week of free agency:

1. If Nnamdi lands with the Jets…

For those of you counting at home, that’s the two best defensive backs in the NFL on the same team. And it’s not even close. Use any statistical metric you can think of and Darrelle Revis will be ranked at or near the top of the league. Even last season, after suffering through a nagging hamstring injury, Revis managed to remain the best cornerback in terms of the Football Outsider’s success rate statistic which measures “the percentage of passes that don't manage to get at least 45 percent of needed yards on first down, 60 percent of needed yards on second down, or 100 percent of needed yards on third down.” Advanced defensive metrics are still in their wee infancy but the Football Outsider’s success rate statistic is probably the best out there.

And what about Nnamdi Asomugha? He was only targeted 31 times last year. That’s 26 times less than Revis, 52 times less than star Packer defensive back Tramon Williams, and 34 times less than perennial all-pro Champ Bailey. His targets were so low that he wasn’t even ranked with Revis and the other cornerbacks with 40+ targets during the season.

If this marriage happens (it’s reportedly between the Jets and Cowboys at this point) than Rex Ryan will be able to blitz literally whenever he wants. With a safety net of two cornerbacks that won’t be beat deep (or anywhere for that matter) Ryan can send seven men every single third down. In football’s modern age this kind of pairing is unprecedented. This is the football universe’s version of the Dwyane Wade—LeBron James coup. As a New England Patriots supporter I’m getting light-headed but as a football fan I’m beyond excited. Witnessing things that have never been done before and observing the unbelievable is what we watch sports for, right?

2. When will they learn?

Here’s two etched-in-stone, irrefutable rules of professional football: runningbacks are cursed with woefully short shelf-lives, and you shouldn’t overpay quarterbacks who are unproven or past their prime even if you’re lacking a sure-fire signal caller.

-Evidence for rule #1: LaDainian Tomlinson fell off dramatically at age 29, Shaun Alexander fell off the face of the earth at age 27, and Edgerrin James collapsed after age 30. That’s only the tip of the iceberg; NFL history is rife with running backs falling off dramatically once they hit their late 20’s, and the curse of thirty is well known.

-Evidence for rule #2: Derek Anderson, Matt Cassell, Donovan McNabb, Jake Delhomme, Jay Cutler, and many more.

And yet, despite evidence to the contrary, general managers continue lauding aging half-backs and mediocre quarterbacks with large contracts. Arizona traded a top-flight young cornerback and a 2012 second round pick for quarterback Kevin Kolb with all of 120 minutes of solid quarterbacking under his belt. They then awarded Kolb $21.5 million guaranteed just to give him a little extra motivation, because, you know, everyone’s more motivated to work hard when they’re set financially for life by age 27.

Carolina also gave running back DeAngelo Williams $21 million guaranteed although he’s accumulated only 1,478 rushing yards and eight total touchdowns the past two seasons combined after a sensational 2008 campaign. It may be unwise to guarantee an aging running back that hasn’t produced at a pro-bowl rate for two years and has played a full 16 game season ONCE $21 million dollars. Just a thought…

Screw it, that was not just a thought. WHAT THE HELL WERE THEY THINKING?

3. Are the New England Patriots really smart or really dumb?

I can’t decide. I’m inclined to go with the former, but it may just be because I’m a huge homer. The argument in favor of the deals for Albert Haynesworth and Chad Ochocinco is their high-reward, low-risk nature. Both players are coming in on non-guaranteed contracts so if either irks management they can be cut with minimal financial impact on the Patriots.

If Haynesworth works out though, New England is receiving one of the best defensive players in the league, capable of being a simply dominant defensive lineman. His 8.5 sacks and 3 forced fumbles in 2008 earned him five votes in defensive player of the year voting, a pro bowl selection, and earned him a first-team all-pro selection. If the Patriots can get even half of the havoc Haynesworth caused in his 2008 campaign than their defensive line and pass rush will be receiving a significant upgrade.

Arguments abound regarding Chad Ochocinco’s continued effectiveness as a pass catcher. The numbers show that Chad has fallen off in recent years as his catch rate has lowered to 53 percent—a pretty good indicator that his time as a legitimate deep threat is coming to an end. Considering the Patriots already have non-deep threats in Wes Welker and Deion Branch, it’s a curious pick up. It’s another weapon for Tom Brady, sure, but probably not the type they needed in their arsenal.

But here’s the bottom line: both players are coming in on the cheap, both should be motivated, and both can be sent packing for almost nothing. In that respect, only good things can come out of these two trades…

4. Patience is a virtue…

We see it every year; the smartest organizations bide their time, lock up their own players, and give team-friendly contracts to under-the-radar free agents or past their prime stars willing to take less money for a chance at a ring.

Here’s what the five best teams record-wise have done in free agency up until this point:

-New England Patriots (14-3): traded a fifth round pick in 2012 for Albert Haynesworth; traded a low-round pick in 2012 and 2013 for Chad Ochocinco and re-worked his contract so it would fit comfortably under their salary cap; resigned Sammy Morris; signed two draft picks and 12 undrafted rookies.

-Pittsburgh Steelers (14-5): locked up defensive back Ike Taylor; signed kicker Shaun Suisham; released Max Starks, Flozell Adams and Antwaan Randle El; resigned Willie Colon and Jonathan Scott.

-Green Bay Packers (14-6): locked up kicker Mason Crosby long-term; released Brady Poppinga and Justin Harrell; released Nick Barnett.

-Atlanta Falcons (13-4): signed Ray Edwards; cut Michael Jenkins and Jamaal Anderson; signed first-round draft pick Julio Jones; resigned Tyson Clabo, Mike Peterson, and Stephen Nicholas.

-New York Jets (13-6): re-signed Santonio Holmes to a monster contract; signed six undrafted rookie free agents; resigned kicker Nick Folk; resigned tackle Wayne Hunter; reportedly knee deep in the chase for Nnamdi.

With the exception of the Jets if they land Nnamdi, all five teams either concentrated on locking up their own players or picked up/traded for cheap, high-reward low-risk assets. Is it a coincidence that the league’s best teams aren’t shelling out tens of millions of dollars for the likes of Charles Johnson, Jonathan Joseph, and Kevin Kolb during the first three days of free agency? Probably not.

5. The Cincinnati Bengals are closing in on one accomplishment at least…

…as the NFL’s most morbid franchise. That’s right; they might be leap-frogging the Raiders as everyone’s favorite perennial dreg.

Let’s look at their first week of free agency:

-Owner Mike brown refuses to trade Carson Palmer despite Palmer’s continued claims he will retire unless he’s given a new home. Can you say “massive distraction” fast enough?

-Cincinnati traded Chad Ochocinco to the Patriots for a paper clip and a used ear swab (actually a fifth-round pick in 2012 and a sixth-round pick in 2013) when, according to Pro Football Talk, the Redskins offered a first-rounder and a third-rounder (which could have been another first-rounder) for Ochcinco in 2008. Guess what; Mike Brown refused.

-Lost their best player in cornerback Jonathan Joseph to the Texans on a $50 million dollar contract when they seemingly expected him to return.

-Released injury-plagued Antwan Odom despite an eight sack performance in 2009 in only six games and his relative youth (29). Yes, he’s been hurt the past two years, but it’s not like the Bengals are “stacked” on the defensive line.

Ladies and gentleman, Mike brown and your 2011-2012 Cincinnati Bengals!

Advanced Baseball Metrics For Idiots (Like Myself)

Advanced baseball stats are complicated. I needed a way to better digest the various "FIP's", "OPS's", and "UZR's" lest I botch one of the fifty million or so acronyms that comprise sabermetrics in future writings.

To save myself I came up with these handy index cards that feature short descriptions of various popular advanced baseball statistics, a league average number that provides some context, and the acronym written out to keep myself sane.

I figured I would share these with everyone in case others are equally mathematically impaired. Keep in mind that these are VERY concise descriptions that are meant to remind yourself what everything means rather than go into great detail. For that we have FanGraphs and Baseball Prospectus.

These are by no means all inclusive, so all suggestions or improvements are very much welcome.

The cards look a little funky in Google Docs but should straighten out once you open them in Microsoft Word.

https://docs.google.com/leaf?id=0B-3Nl-BGx_52MWM5MDRiMjQtMjg5ZC00Mjc5LTgxM2UtYTBkZGM2NzQ3MGFk&hl=en_US

Enjoy!

Dissecting Boston’s Mystery Man: Rajon Rondo

Maybe it’s because I’m a Celtics fan, but there isn’t a more fascinating figure in basketball than Rajon Rondo. I could make the case for all of sports, but unfortunately, Brian Wilson exists.

Allow me to make my argument in four parts:

1. No one gives an interview like Rajon Rondo, NO ONE. Plenty of other athletes mumble through their answers (Moses Malone), have an endearing love of sarcasm, or are so dry that they can’t get through an interview without being interrupted, but no one manages to combine all three qualities quite as exquisitely as Rondo. Ample proof here, thanks to CelticsHub.

2. One of the more inconsistently phenomenal players in professional basketball; Rondo will follow up a 12-23-10 masterpiece against the Spurs with a 9-7-4, 6 turnover stinker against the lowly Raptors. While the 2009-2010 Boston Celtics proved to be masters of “flipping the switch”, Rondo has shown that he is a savant.

3. There’s a lot of attributes that factor into an athlete’s success in the NBA, one of which, of course, being physical ability. With his inhumanly large hands Rondo (seriously, those hands fit proportionately on Yao Ming’s body, and he’s 7-foot-6. Rondo is 6-foot-1.) can cradle a basketball like I can grip a whiffle ball. Those oven mitts combined with his superb floor vision results in the occasional pass or layup that needs to be seen multiple times to believe. He’s the Blake Griffin of point guards.

Recall this pass from the 2009 playoffs that shook LeBron’s confidence so violently he decided to leave Cleveland and begin a new basketball life hundreds of miles away (at least that’s what my sources tell me).

4. Remember in High School (and even college) when you would wear that mask of indifference on your face through class like a prize, pretending you didn’t care. It’s like a little game: who can pretend to care the least about education (and just for your information, I was a standout)? Rondo wears it with a pride and never seems to want to take it off. I don’t doubt the man’s work ethic nor do I think Rondo lacks passion for the game (for Christ’s sake, he played with one arm against Miami just a couple of months ago), but his facial expressions—or lack thereof—can be unnerving.

And the way Rondo seems to flit through the dog days of the regular season without really, really going all-out can be a little maddening to Celtics fans hoping Boston finishes hot enough to lock up the number one seed. But alas, Rondo loses interest and tries firing 40-foot bounce passes through traffic to Troy Murphy. Kind of like how Bird used to shoot left-handed because he was bored.

But here’s the thing: we have no idea how high Rondo’s ceiling is. Is this it? Have his assist numbers been inflated because he plays with three future hall of famers? What happens when Ray Allen, Paul Pierce, and Kevin Garnett retire, and the Celtics are all Rondo’s? Does he follow the path of Jason Kidd and finally obtain that elusive jump shot that is the difference between a very, very good point guard and just a good one?

Is Rondo’s jump shot actually improving?

Rondo, ever the inconsistent one, has had up and down shooting percentages from year to year since he came into the league. He shot 41 percent from 10 to 15 feet during his rookie season, improved to 45 percent his sophomore campaign, plummeted to 35 percent year three, then improved to a whopping 47 percent year four and finally sank to his lowest total ever when he shot 31 percent this past season. It’s hard to glean anything particularly insightful when the data is so varied from year to year.

But looking at Rondo’s 2010-2011 campaign compared to his previous four, it may have been an outlier. Rondo managed only 4.3 attempts at the rim and 1.1 from three to nine feet even though from years one through four his shot attempts at those locations steadily increased. Overall, Rondo’s offensive output was his lowest since the 2007-2008 season.

What does this all mean? Rondo has yet to develop a consistent jump shot. A genius conclusion, I know, but Rondo’s offensive production seems to go in waves and pertains as much too nights when his shot is falling to whether the “big three” is feeling it. He’ll always be a pass-first point guard, but a more consistent offensive game is what we’re all waiting for. Whether it takes an actual living, breathing jump shot, a greater piece of the offensive pie, or something else entirely remains to be seen.

Has Rondo’s offensive growth been stunted by the “Big Three”?

For four years Rondo has had Ray Allen spotting up behind the three-point line, Paul Pierce as a go-to offensive weapon, and Kevin Garnett setting up in the post or lurking 18-20 feet from the basket ready to fire away with his deadly mid-range jumper. That’s quite a safety net for a budding point guard. His passing has always been exquisite, his court vision superb, and he’s even grown into a leader after struggling to earn the respect of Boston’s veteran superstars. But he’s never attempted more than 12 shots per game in a single season and he’s only put up double-digit shot attempts once—in 2009-2010. He attempted a mere 5.8 shots per game his rookie season.

This was inevitable once General Manager Danny Ainge traded for Kevin Garnett and Ray Allen, making Rajon Rondo the fourth offensive option by default. He’s performed the role admirably—managing ego’s, running the offense, and feeding the hot hand. What else could you expect from a young player teaming up with such ingrained NBA figures?

Consider the situations of other all-star point guards when they entered the league. Derrick Rose attempted 15 shots per game during his rookie campaign; Chris Paul averaged 12; Deron Williams just over 10. None of them were flanked by players even close to the caliber of Rajon Rondo’s teammates. All three were taken considerably higher in the first round, but regardless, they were forced to assume a much greater scoring responsibility than Rajon Rondo has ever had to. One would assume that his offensive responsibilities will only increase once the “Big Three” retire (which figures to be very soon, as all three are at least 33 years of age). I’d like to think Ainge will reload and surround Rondo with adequate talent, but whichever way you look at it, Rondo’s share of the pie is about to get a whole lot bigger.

You could make an argument that Williams, Paul, and Rose were all blessed with superior talent than Rondo—that their jumpers are intrinsically purer, their forays to the basket cleaner, and their scoring instincts more defined. But I don’t buy it; hidden somewhere under that hard exterior is the ability to dominate, the ability to change from a floor manager content to control the court like a chess grandmaster to an offensive force able to score at will. We’ve all seen the way Chris Paul bides his time, subtly manages the game, gets his teammates going, and then explodes in the fourth quarter to ice the contest. His performance against the Los Angeles Lakers in the first round of the 2011 playoffs was simply masterful, and was a reminder of what point guard play at the absolute highest level looks—and feels like.

Rajon Rondo is capable of that—we’ve all seen it. But it’s rare and you have to savor every stunning performance. He doesn’t put it all together nearly enough, and I wonder whether his low position on the offensive totem pole has contributed to his inconsistent scoring. The presence of three sterling athletes—and men—has certainly contributed to Rondo’s growth as a player and assuaged the hot-headedness that once made him “un-coachable”, but his offensive growth has suffered as a result. Give me a choice between four title-less, Kevin Garnett-less years or the four deep playoff runs, drama-filled seasons Boston fans have enjoyed, I’ll take option two without a second thought. It’s a bit of a paradox: without the winning atmosphere cultivated by Boston’s culture change in the 07’-08’ season Rondo may have gone down in Boston lore as a stubborn, belligerent jack-ass unwilling to learn or admit he’s even got anything to learn. After all, that’s why Rondo wasn’t taken in the top ten of the NBA draft, where his talent dictated. Instead, he learned his lesson, made two All-Star games (and counting), and forced his way into the best-point-guard-in-the-league discussion. But without the “Big Three” Rondo may have developed a better offensive game by virtue of more reps.

By all accounts Rondo needed the presence of a couple veteran stars, but still, you have to wonder…

Is Boston’s system holding Rondo back?

At Kentucky, where Rondo played for two years before entering the NBA draft, Coach Tubby Smith utilized a deliberate “flex-offense” at odds with Rondo’s greatest physical attribute: speed.

According to Smith in this Boston.com column, “He'd want his teammates to run with him. I would tell him, 'Rajon you've got to slow down because you're just so far in front sometimes. It's like a relay. You've got to receive the baton in the exchange zone or we're disqualified.' ”

The Celtics also play a slow, half-court offense that may not be utilizing Rajon Rondo’s skill set to the fullest. According to Hoopdata’s pace statistic which measures the average number of possessions used in a game, the Celtics rank 23rd, meaning they use 92.3 possessions per game. That’s REALLY slow, right down there with the offensive dregs of the league like the Milwaukee Bucks, Detroit Pistons, and Charlotte Bobcats. That’s not to say Boston’s offense is poor, just that it is slow (plenty of solid offenses play at a slower pace).

Doc Rivers pleading with his team to run, run, run is a common sight on the TNT “Coaches’ Cam”, but with 33 year-old Kevin Garnett, 33 year-old Paul Pierce (who has never been particularly fast), soon to be 36 year-old Ray Allen, the decaying corpse of Shaquille O’Neal, and a host of aging players it’s like praying that your glass of water will turn into wine. Beyond trying to get younger, why do you think Ainge traded for Jeff Green; a player who on paper is a perfect complement to Rondo with his speed, athleticism, and finishing ability. Much to the chagrin of Celtic’s fans, it didn’t work out. At all. But at least you can see what Ainge was trying to accomplish.

History has shown that a fast paced offense doesn’t necessarily make a great offense (see: 2011 Minnesota Timberwolves). But what would happen if Rondo was surrounded by quicker and more athletic players? What if Boston could concentrate on pushing the basketball for easy buckets rather than trying to preserve old legs? The Celtics are certainly efficient in transition, but their opportunities are few and far between. With Rondo’s immense court vision and mastery of the fast break what if he was surrounded by athletes that liked to run, run, and run. Could we be looking at a new breed of offense?

This would require an entirely different Celtics team comprised of youth and athleticism and a focus on abundance of opportunities rather than a reliance on efficiency. Boston shot over 50 percent often last year, but they continued to struggle offensively because they managed a low number of shot attempts per game and placed a heavy reliance on elite marksmanship. To put that in English, there was no Plan B if the jumpers weren't falling. Ainge will have an opportunity to change all that once Garnett, Allen, and Pierce retire in the coming years.

The system wasn’t terrible, but as Boston’s best three players aged and Rajon Rondo emerged it became illogical to run a system geared toward Ray Allen, Paul Pierce, and Kevin Garnett.

Where does Rajon Rondo go from here?

Here’s one thing I know for sure: it won’t be where we expect it to. Not the way Rondo’s career path has twisted and turned from a troubled two years at Kentucky where he struggled to fit into Coach Tubby Smith’s slow and deliberate style of basketball to a rookie NBA year in which Rondo managed to play only 23 minutes per game. For a long time it seemed like he couldn’t get along with any of his coaches, all because he wanted to do things his way or not at all. As Celtics Coach Doc Rivers put it, “He was answering the question before the question was asked, and it wasn’t the right answer sometimes.”

Several things could happen over the remaining five years of Doc Rivers’ new contract: Ainge could acquire some serious young talent to place around Rondo and position Boston to contend for the next decade (I hope so), Ainge could continue the “win now” mentality and sign veteran pieces like he’s been doing for the past four years (hopefully unlikely), or Ainge could be feeling a little risqué and trade Rondo for a different elite piece (please God, no). Every NBA fan on Earth should hope it's option number one so the real Rondo can emerge and blossom.

Whatever happens, Rondo will always be my favorite athlete to don a Celtic’s uniform. From his hilarious interviews, to his little quarks (like how he used to wear his headband upside down until the league said it wasn’t allowed), to the way he fly’s around the court, demands to guard the opponent’s best player (during the 2011 playoffs he guarded LeBron James for short spurts to give Paul Pierce a rest. Surprisingly, it worked.), and when he’s at his best—plays a frenetic, frenzied, yet somehow completely controlled game. Doesn’t make sense? With Rondo, it does.

All statistics are from Hoopdata unless otherwise stated.

Revenue Sharing: The Key to Basketball’s Future No One is Talking About?

These are exciting times in the National Basketball Association, and I mean that with utmost sincerity. The cloud of a year without professional basketball is heavy indeed, but those in power have a real chance to set the NBA on the true path and ensure success for the next decade with a well thought-out and fair Collective Bargaining Agreement. Will it happen? Judging from small samples the media has been able to procure from closed-door sessions between the owners and the players association, talks have been about as fruitful as a conversation with a brick wall. But alas, that’s just how these things seem to go, and real progress is never made until the 11th hour of the 11th hour of the 11th hour. And you know what? In some ways I don’t blame the two sides (Okay, that’s a lie), because the situation is about as complicated as it could be.

If you take a look at the current labor agreements of the four major professional sports—the NFL, MLB, NBA, and NHL—one thing should immediately jump out: they are all exceedingly different and each one boasts its own inherent strengths and weaknesses. For instance, the NHL and MLB possess excellent player development leagues integral to the health of their sports, while professional football and basketball tend to pluck their prospects from college and immediately toss them into the fire. A select few are ready to contribute right away, a few more reach their potential in several years, and the vast majority fail miserably. The NBA’s developmental league might contribute next to nil to the professional game, but its CBA boasts its own advantages. For example, NBA players earn a higher average salary than any other sports league in America and its players enjoy fully guaranteed contracts. NFL players, on the other hand, can be cut practically on a whim.

But there is one stipulation familiar to all our favorite leagues: revenue sharing. It’s the life-blood of the NFL and NHL, practically non-existent in the NBA, and eminently exploitable in baseball. Revenue sharing, of course, is the process by which teams pool their profits together and then split it up amongst the league. There’s different ways of splitting the revenue, but generally the richer teams fork over more money and lower market teams receive larger shares. Ideally, it evens the playing field between the bigger markets and smaller ones, and allows teams such as the Green Bay Packers or Buffalo Bills to compete. In terms of parity and revenue sharing the NFL is the league all others aspire to. But it begets several interesting questions: Is the NFL the outlier among professional sports—an unrealistic goal for the lesser leagues; and is parity truly necessary?

Zach Lowe tackled both questions in this excellent column before the holiday weekend. In his piece Lowe talked to David Berri, an economics professor at Southern Utah University. Berri had some very interesting things to say, namely that the sport of basketball is inherently uncompetitive. Lowe quotes him as saying, “The NBA has never been a competitive league, and it’s never going to be a competitive league” and, “Some teams get the best players and some teams don’t. However you shuffle the league, it’s going to be the case that a few teams are dominant and a bunch of teams are not — just like in the 1980s, with the Celtics, Pistons, Sixers and Lakers.” It’s hard to argue with what Berri says, as the post-merger NBA has been dominated by a select few teams—including the six-time champion Chicago Bulls of the 90’s, the trio of titles won by the Celtics in the 80’s, the 10 championships won by the Lakers over the past three decades, followed by the dynastic Spurs of the new millennium and a couple of titles won by the Pistons and Rockets. Commissioner Stern and company are constantly harping on a better competitive balance throughout the league, and point to revenue sharing as an excellent solution, but does the NBA truly need parity? I argued this in my previous piece on the labor front, but I’ll reiterate: parity in the top half of the NBA couldn’t be better, it’s the grand-canyon sized gap between the top half and the bottom half that is cause for concern.

Recently, thanks to some superb investigative journalism by Deadspin and ESPN it has come to light that NBA teams may be embellishing their financial data so as to seem worse off than they actually are. Specifically, Deadspin acquired financial documents from the 2005-2006 New Jersey Nets and ESPN took a look at documents leaked to the public that pertain to the New Orleans Hornets from the 2008-2009 season. Granted, the documents are dated, but both teams used archaic (yet perfectly legal) accounting tricks to accentuate their financial hardships according to both reports. Yet despite all that, Forbes still reports that 17 of the NBA’s 30 franchises lost money in 2009-2010 even though the league as a whole turned a profit thanks to teams such as the Bulls and Lakers who account for much of the league’s overall revenue.

Besides fibbing owners and accountants, one other issue stands between professional basketball’s current model and the NFL’s Holy Grail: television contracts. When folks argue against increased revenue sharing this is usually their biggest argument. Why? Because the NFL’s national television deal is so completely unique and un-replicable unless the NBA decides to cut its schedule by 65-odd games. The NFL, with its inimitable 16 game schedule was able to ink mammoth television deals with CBS, FOX, NBC, and ESPN so all its games are broadcast on national networks unlike in the NBA, where only a few games are seen on the big networks per week and the vast majority are shown on local stations. That’s not to say it’s impossible, just that revenue sharing in the NBA will be much more complicated, as teams will have to essentially give up money they earn from individual television deals they signed independently. Essentially, the structure of the NFL’s television contracts foster cooperation, while the NBA’s (and MLB’s) system does not. But here’s the minimal revenue sharing problem in a nutshell: The Laker’s—under the current system—aren’t required to share ANY of the enormous $150 million local television contract they inked recently with any other team, even if that figure alone is more than some teams make in a season from every revenue source they have, according to NBC Sports.

But that doesn’t mean a better revenue sharing system wouldn’t enhance the NBA’s already-excellent product. Critics point to small-market teams like the Oklahoma City Thunder as evidence that intelligent management and a little bit of luck is all it takes for lower-revenue teams to compete with the titans, and that plenty of massive-market franchises (such as the Los Angeles Clippers, New York Knicks, and Houston Rockets) fail despite being able to pay any number of players they would like. But will the Thunder be able to afford Kevin Durant, Russell Westbrook, James Harden, and Serge Ibaka in the future—four players who figure to cash in big-time (Durant already as) once their rookie contracts expire? The problem persists in baseball, where break-out players on small market teams are stolen by huge markets like the Red Sox and Yankees. Take the San Diego Padres for example, who lost elite talent Adrian Gonzalez this past offseason to the Boston Red Sox on a $154 million contract they simply couldn’t afford to match, or the Tampa Bay Rays who are forced to make difficult and often controversial personnel decisions every year.

Plenty of folk’s way more experienced with the “business of sports” than I am have offered up their own revenue sharing proposals. Andrew Zimbalist (a big name in sports economics), in Zach Lowe’s formerly referred to piece, endorsed a revenue sharing system that would redistribute the wealth based on market size rather than earned revenue. David Aldridge, in this superb piece about the lockout, proposes a plan in which teams split more of the percentage from ticket sales (like the NFL’s 60-40 split) and a split of local T.V money. Both are sound, and both would save the NBA.

The heart of the lockout lies in management’s belief that the players are making too much money, and they’re using what may or may not be faulty financial data to support their claim that franchises are losing money in droves. We’ll probably never know the truth as the NBA won’t open their books to the public, but revenue sharing remains an extremely viable solution being put on the back-burner by ownership. The Player’s Union is pushing for it to become a part of CBA negotiations but the suits won’t have it, claiming they can only deal with it after the core financial model of the league is determined—meaning once the players take massive pay-cuts and ownership is back in the black. My greatest fear is that the owners increase their profit margin at the expense of the players—just to save some money—while the health of the league is not actually improved. The rich continue to get richer, the poor end up turning a profit, but it’s all for naught because the gap hasn’t been closed.

Revenue sharing isn’t the magic elixir; the finite solution that will suddenly morph every team into a contender, or save David Kahn from himself. But it WILL give those small markets the extra ammunition they need to retain their stars, chase big-name free agents, and climb the mountaintop. And that, most of all, is what I want to see. Owners have no one to blame but themselves—after all they’re the ones that sign off on the hellacious and indefensible contracts given to the likes of Rashard Lewis, Baron Davis, and Gilbert Arenas—but from what we’ve seen the NBA’s model of business has some major faults, no matter the length some owners go to make it look like they’re losing more than they actually are.

The new Collective Bargaining Agreement will hinge on much, much more than revenue sharing, and I would like to cover the salary cap, the split of Basketball-Related Income (BRI), and player salaries in greater detail. However, I believe sharing the wealth is the most viable solution for struggling markets that doesn’t involve massive cuts to player salary and a draconian split of BRI. Just like in all negotiations, finding the middle ground is key…why not start with revenue sharing?